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      1. In October 2003, Bolivian movements faced the deadliest repression in a quarter century, and yet they succeeded in overthrowing a president. This is "backfire," a moment when repression dramatically fails for those who initiate it. The subject of my newly published article.
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    1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
      Lethal repression often fails, "leading to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance campaign, creating dissent and conflicts among [regime] supporters, [and] increasing external support for the resistance campaign" (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011).
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  1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
    But "backfire," a concept articulated by Brian Martin, has an uncertain relationship with the kinds of tactics that predominate in Bolivian movements, what I call "unarmed militancy."
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    1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
      Unarmed militants refuse to yield in confrontations with state forces; they fight back in uneven contests in order to hold physical space, obstruct the flows of daily life, and impose social costs.
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      1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
        Unarmed militants often maintain cooperative, even immersive, relationships with larger mass movements, particularly in mass movements of the Global South. The relationship can be mutually beneficial. woborders.blog/published-elsewhere/unarmed-militancy/
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        1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
          However, theorists of backfire (Martin, Sharp, Lakey, Chenoweth & Stephan) are generally skeptical of any fighting back, something that runs counter to the tradition of nonviolence from which it, and the equivalent "political jiu-jitsu" emerged.
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          1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
            Chenoweth and Stephan argue that both the likelihood and the strength of backfire are amplified when a movement maintains nonviolent discipline and clear contrast between their nonviolent means and the violence used by their state opponents.
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            1. …in reply to @CarwilBJ
              Chenoweth's advice: "‘neither fighting back with their own counterviolence or … retreating in disarray." But Bolivian movements responded differently, fighting to hold space, and sometimes causing fatalities among security forces. What happened then? x.com/CarwilBJ/status/1783876854421549205
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