-
What's stands out to me from the NYT profile piece on Russian trolls targeting @womensmarch / @lsarsour is how much it followed the "divide and disrupt" playbook from COINTELPRO. Sarsour was bad jacketed, rumors were invented and amplified, divisions were reinforced.
-
The fact that a state-backed troll farm can do this doesn't change defense strategies: stay calm, verify rumors, decentralize leadership, address conflicts, and take internal abuse seriously.
-
In fact if Russia can do it, so can other intelligence agencies, corporate consultancies, and the FBI. And no doubt, some of each category was involved in dividing / disrupting opposition to Trump.
-
A certain amount of "don't believe the hype" and "don't fall for the troll farm" mass education needs to be part of movement building and this episode can contribute to that.
-
Reposting common tactics used to "divide and disrupt" movements and common sense movement priorities to resist them. @CarwilBJ/1271651496480903170?t=-4GYZsqEA3NKoSCOHZzpNg&s=19
-
And a thread with sources. @CarwilBJ/1271602987123781632?t=-4GYZsqEA3NKoSCOHZzpNg&s=19 It's good movement security practice to not make accusations without proof, and (when possible) to give people reliable sources to check instead of asking them to just trust you
