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ICYMI, my pre-publication research on the outcomes of deadly repression in Bolivia since 1982 shows that fighting back did not diminish a movement's chances of success. @CarwilBJ/1534583221760966657On twitter.com
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Most large movements in Bolivia combine mass mobilization with combative efforts to hold urban space or at least resist police crackdowns. I call this combination "unarmed militancy." woborders.blog/published-elsewhere/unarmed-militancy/Permalink On twitter.com
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My new quantitative research compares events where cointerviolence resulted in deaths among security forces and those where it did not. Movement success was equally likely under these scenarios.Permalink On twitter.com
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Even in most of the cases where all deaths were suffered by protesters, the movements usually fought back in the streets. Often in combination with hunger strikes and other nonviolent protest tactics.Permalink On twitter.com
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Much of the literature on civil resistance and the backfire of repression claims that fighting back will undermine movement cohesion, narrow mobilization to a few, and alienate the public.Permalink On twitter.com
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Empirically, that isn't true in Bolivia. It's also at odds with the experience of Argentina, Oaxaca, Egypt, and Ukraine.Permalink On twitter.com
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Yet scholar's descriptions of how backfire, mass noncooperation, and civil resistance work are incredibly insightful for understanding combative mass movements like those in Bolivia.Permalink On twitter.com
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For a detailed look at movement tactics and strategy in Bolivia, check out my book, The Sovereign Street. sovereignstreet.orgPermalink On twitter.com