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Broader point for international diplomats: The 2019 Bolivian crisis should be a case study of how *not* to resolve a crisis over alleged electoral fraud.
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On its face, there was an election with a 10% margin between a left-of-center and right-of-center candidate. Anti-fraud protests saw 4 deaths. Then after the president resigned, a far-right interim government killed over two dozen people, and jailed hundreds.
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At the hinge point of the crisis, there were succession talks attended by the Catholic Church and European Union diplomats. While all sides talked of avoiding bloodshed through these talks, bloodshed dramatically increased after them. A diplomatic failure.
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In a closely divided country split over an election, any interim government ought to have the trust (or at least acceptance) of the two leading political parties. Any interim government should agree to scrupulous neutrality.
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International legitimacy should be contingent on these standards.
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At a minimum, no foreign government should have recognized Áñez's rushed succession until multiparty talks concluded in November. No foreign government should have sent riot gear and munitions to it.
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More optimally, a politically diverse and regionally representative set of mediators, including figures on the South American left and right should have been involved. And willing to slow down the process to get things right.
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Despite its long pre-1982 history of coups, Bolivia has managed presidential succession in the wake of protests right in 1985, 2003, and 2005. With elections, official humility, and presidential outreach to protesters.
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In 2005, doing so required a negotiated skip down the line of succession. There were options in 2019. But they weren't taken.
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Bolivia's neighbors, elder statesmen of the region, intergovernmental human rights bodies, and broadly acceptable political bodies like the UN should all be planning to do better next time something like this happens.