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Reviewing the Bolivian political standoffs of 2006–09 and 2019, it seems to me that partisan movements help their cause by winning unarmed confrontations but can tank their cause by winning armed confrontations.Permalink On twitter.com
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Or alternatively that claiming physical space against one's opponents is valuable, while imposing injuries, deaths, and humiliations is something of a liability.Permalink On twitter.com
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The Morales government of 2007, 2008 kept retreating from the deadliest moments of conflict…Permalink On twitter.com
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Two supporters (and one opponent) killed in Cochabamba on January 11, 2007? Stand down the police, urge supporters to abandon city.Permalink On twitter.com
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Opponents attempt riotously take over the Constituent Assembly while it is voting to approve the draft Constitution in November 2007? (An event which is more like January 6, 2021 in the US than anything else I know of)Permalink On twitter.com
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Hold them off for one night (killing 3) then pull both constitutional assembly members and police entirely out of the city. Also, evacuate the governor whose house was burned down.On twitter.com
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Supporters want to confront the opposition in Santa Cruz (and are justifiably livid over the Porvenir massacre) in September 2008? Redirect them to La Paz for a peaceful march.Permalink On twitter.com
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Conversely, the Porvenir massacre itself basically consolidated UNASUR against the separatist/autonomist Right.Permalink On twitter.com
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And Evo and Alvaro both knew this strategy. Especially in an international environment that can easily close ranks against a leftist government with blood on its hands.Permalink On twitter.com
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I mean, here's Evo Morales on October 24, 2019: @CarwilBJ/1481328447976886280Permalink On twitter.com
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And yet, in a series of apparently uncoordinated regional decisions, parts of the MAS-IPSP coalition will escalate to armed violence in Montero and rural Oruro/Potosí, spiral into high-intensity street fights in Cochabamba, and commit a fatal beating in La Paz.Permalink On twitter.com
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Each of these was a step towards the kind of "violent instability" that military and police swoop into claiming to restore order. The UJC deaths in Montero and Potosí victims in the caravan each radicalized opponents.Permalink On twitter.com
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It's just dumb luck that UJC gunfire didn't also kill MAS supporters in Plan 3000 on October 28. And the RJC falsely pinned on death in Cochabamba on the MAS on November 6.Permalink On twitter.com
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But there are clear strategic errors by the MAS-IPSP and its base, measured against Morales' admonition to "not fall into provocation." They fell, and it seems to have had consequences.Permalink On twitter.com