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@NicoMason2 Thanks for laying that out… There's a narrow and wider point here…
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@NicoMason2 First, though, I have to point out that… nonviolent / violence justified / unjustified right / wrong are not the same axis, from my point of view.
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@NicoMason2 Much complaining could start there, but fundamentally, for example, people who believe in police forces believe that these thing are not the same division. (Only people defending non-state tactics are typically held accountable to the standard where all violence is unjustified.)
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@NicoMason2 The narrow is issue is around Evo Morales's calls for mobilization, and here we need to divide Evo as president and Evo as ousted president, in terms of his moral responsibilities.
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@NicoMason2 Morales called for counter-blockades around cities to challenge the anti-fraud movement's blockades within cities. Also mass gatherings to challenge their mass gatherings.
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@NicoMason2 This is super-normal in Bolivia. By directing countermobilization around the cities, you lessen direct confrontation and reduce—though not eliminate—violence. (This, by the way, is how Morales de-escalated the national crisis in Sep 2008.)
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@NicoMason2 In metro Cochabamba, where the pro-MAS groups tried the opposite tactical scenario: running through the middle of cities to break up anti-Morales blockades, you saw serious injuries and one death.
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@NicoMason2 The violence-lessening and democracy-enabling feature of two sides competing through maintaining simultaneous blockades is that the relative numbers and commitment of the two sides determines the outcome.
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@NicoMason2 Turning to after Morales' ouster, then you did have all the violent rhetoric you spoke of (rhetoric ≠ violence, imho, ymmv). Note that all of that rhetoric reprised exactly the 2003 tarifazo and gas war.
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@NicoMason2 There was genuine middle-class/public fear, even terror, in both cases. Which I don't dismiss. I suspect that moral evaluations of whether such talk/threats are acceptable depends on one's identity and political positions.
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@NicoMason2 In 2019, that militancy and its direction led to deep divisions within El Alto, as well as between Paceños and the Alteños/Altiplano protesters they feared. woborders.blog/2019/11/18/division-el-alto/
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@NicoMason2 Some would obviously say that “Now, yes, civil war” is an appropriate reaction to a coup. Others, obviously not.
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@NicoMason2 Soon after the open confrontations of November 10-13, came a more organized mass protest movement, marked by the march to La Paz, blockades in the Chapare (and rural Santa Cruz), and a La Paz blockade campaign radiating out from El Alto.
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@NicoMason2 Re whether Evo's call to blockade the cities was sedition, criminal, or wrong per se, my answer is no. I've written this: woborders.blog/2019/12/19/sedition-arrest-evo/
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@NicoMason2 Tactics are morally significant actions, and we should have judgments about them. Too often, however, tactical arguments are intended to disqualify the side one opposes. At times, this happens while willfully ignoring the same tactics used by the side one prefers.
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@NicoMason2 Beyond blockades, protesters in the 2019 crisis also used: 1. unarmed street combat 2. arson of polling places 3. arson of homes 4. arson of public buildings 5. other property destruction 6. motorized assault brigades 7. gunfire in confrontations 8. tear gas 9. targeted beatings
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@NicoMason2 It's fair to call all these violent. At a minimum… Pro-MAS: 134579 Anti-MAS: 1234569 Morales govt: 18 Military/Áñez govt: 1789
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@NicoMason2 with a huge disparity in deadly outcomes… pro-MAS killed 4* before Evo's ouster / 3-4 after anti-MAS killed 1-2 after Morales govt: 0 Military, Áñez govt: 25-28 * Julio Llanos died after from injuries sustained in October.