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@DiegoJEsca Acknowledging that the idea of a police-as-electoral-protector mission is purely hypothetical in Bolivia, let's talk about the MAS-IPSP and partisan politics inside the Chapare for a minute.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca The MAS-IPSP was originally designed to subordinate the party to large grassroots movements like the coca growers union. This system functions closer to its original intent in rural areas, where local candidates are proposed by unions and vetted by assemblies.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca Once a candidate is chosen by an assembly union members pledge to support that candidate at the polls. This can result in very high vote shares for the MAS-IPSP, and also social pressure to vote for the party.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca Where there are unions that actually administer local goods, or where unions are the social formation that allowed people to survive a traumatic and violent period, these cohesive and coercive forces (which both pull in the same direction) are stronger.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca In local elections in Villa Tunari municipality (which covers much of the Chapare), the MAS-IPSP is the dominant force since much of the municipality belongs to the grassroots orgs that nominate candidates via the party.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca But this isn't unusual at all at the rural level in Bolivia, where the MAS-IPSP is the only effective party in many municipalities. Except in La Paz department, most opposition parties are urban.Permalink On twitter.com
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@DiegoJEsca Despite this overwhelming local dominance, around 12% of Villa Tunari voted against Evo Morales in the 2016 referendum. A much smaller share, 6%, voted for other parties in the official count of the 2019 election (all the caveats about potential fraud apply).On twitter.com
