Tactics of Political Violence in the 2019 Bolivian Crisis

Carwil Bjork-James — Thu, 28 Nov 2024 08:00:00 GMT

Part of a Bolivian Studies Journalspecial issue on the 2019 crisis (2024)

Abstract

During Bolivia’s 2019 political crisis, reactivated modes of political violence occurred within and alongside familiar forms of mass mobilization. In Bolivia’s recent history, this period is most comparable to the 2006–2009 partisan conflict over constitutional reform and departmental autonomy known by the Gramscian term empate catastrófico, or catastrophic stalemate. Although there are many similarities between the two periods, both social movement and institutional norms limiting violence were weakened between the two, resulting in more rapid deployment of destructive tactics and deadlier violence by security forces. As Gramsci’s model argues, greater deployment of force was no guarantee of political success in either crisis. This article examines three extraordinary and destructive tactics: partisan street clashes, sometimes involving firearms; arson attacks on electoral authorities, party offices, politicians’ homes, and police stations; and mass shootings of demonstrators. I describe these three tactics as part of Bolivia’s repertoire of contention—that is, as routinized forms of political action with commonly understood meanings—and compare their use in both the 2006–2009 stalemate and the 2019 crisis. Quantitatively, I analyze the deadly violence in 2019 by drawing on Ultimate Consequences, a comprehensive database of nearly six hundred deaths in Bolivian political conflict since 1982. In the final weeks of Morales’s presidency, violence between opposed civilian groups accounted for all four deaths, whereas several incidents of partisan street clashes involved potentially lethal force. Following Morales’s ouster, however, the security forces became the central violent actor, perpetrating at least twenty-nine of the thirty-four violent deaths.

Citation

Bjork-James, Carwil. 2024. “Tactics of Political Violence in the 2019 Bolivian Crisis: Return of the Catastrophic Stalemate?” Bolivian Studies Journal, 188–226.

When does lethal repression fail?: Unarmed militancy and backfire in Bolivia, 1982–2021

Carwil Bjork-James — Sun, 07 Apr 2024 07:00:00 GMT

Journal of Latin American Studies (2024)

Read article at Cambridge University Press

Abstract

Repressive state violence, intended to tamp down collective mobilisation, sometimes inspires greater participation by protesters. When popular and/or elite reactions cause the repressing party to concede, civil resistance scholars define the failure of state repression as ‘backfire’. Some have proposed that movements’ nonviolent discipline is essential to backfire. This article demonstrates that movements that practise ‘unarmed militancy’ – forceful, combative tactics less damaging than armed violence – can also succeed through backfire, achieving policy concessions and even presidential resignations, and presents a qualitative comparative analysis of the outcomes of 48 protest events with multiple deaths in Bolivia between 1982 and 2019, and a case-based analysis of how either movements or repressors prevailed. Movements that confronted deadly repression succeeded in 57–8 per cent of cases. Whether or not protesters engaged in lethal defensive violence did not affect their likelihood of success. However, state repression of guerrillas and paramilitary groups, and during polarised partisan conflicts, was consistently successful. Current understandings of backfire need to be reconsidered in light of successful unarmed militant protest in Bolivia and numerous other locations worldwide.

Resumen

La violencia estatal represiva, buscando neutralizar a la movilización colectiva, a veces genera una participación mayor de los manifestantes. Cuando la reacción popular y/o la de las élites hace que la parte represora haga concesiones, los académicos trabajando sobre la resistencia civil definen el fracaso de la represión estatal como ‘acto contraproducente’. Algunos han propuesto que la disciplina de la no violencia por parte de los movimientos es esencial para lograr los efectos contrarios de los represores. Este artículo demuestra que los movimientos que practican una ‘militancia desarmada’, es decir, tácticas contundentes y combativas menos dañinas que la violencia armada, pueden también tener éxito y superar a los represores al lograr concesiones políticas e incluso renuncias presidenciales. Este artículo presenta un análisis cualitativo comparado de los resultados de 48 protestas con múltiples muertes en Bolivia entre 1982 y 2019 y un análisis basado en casos sobre cómo los movimientos o sus represores tuvieron éxito. Los movimientos que confrontaron una represión violenta tuvieron éxito en el 57–8% de los casos. El hecho de que los manifestantes participaran o no en una violencia defensiva letal no afectó sus probabilidades de éxito. Sin embargo, la represión estatal hacia las guerrillas o a grupos paramilitares, y durante conflictos polarizados, fue consistentemente exitosa. Los entendimientos actuales del acto contraproducente necesitan ser reconsiderados a la luz de los éxitos de las protestas militantes desarmadas en Bolivia y en otros muchos lugares en todo el mundo.

Citation

Bjork-James, Carwil. “When does lethal repression fail? Unarmed militancy and backfire in Bolivia, 1982–2021.” Journal of Latin American Studies 56, no. 1 (2024): 1–36. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/when-does-lethal-repression-fail-unarmed-militancy-and-backfire-in-bolivia-19822021/EF57368D13F9C5683EE42BD9025F2B6B